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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE
SOCIALIZATION: CONCEPTUAL, EMPIRICAL,
AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
RYAN GOODMAN†
DEREK JINKS††
Debates about how best to design international legal regimes
inadequately attend to the ways in which law influences state
behavior. As a consequence of this deficiency, much of international
law is founded upon the flawed, and often unexamined, assumption
that effective legal regimes must either coerce or persuade target
actors to comply with their requirements. In How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, we argue that (1)
acculturation is a conceptually distinct social process through which
law might influence state behavior; and (2) the elements of the
acculturation process suggest several regime design characteristics
1
unorthodox to human rights law. More generally, we maintain that
the behavioral assumptions of international legal regimes must be
2
more systematically theorized and investigated. Proper specification
of the social mechanisms of law’s influence, we argue, would facilitate
the development of an integrated theory of regime design—one that
accounts for the various social mechanisms, specifies the conditions
under which they predominate, and identifies the regime design
features that best harness these forces.3
In thoughtful and probing reply essays, Dean Harold Hongju
Koh and Professor José Alvarez raise several important questions
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1. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
2. See id. at 624 (suggesting that the emphasis on whether law matters, characteristic of
the “first generation” of empirical international legal studies, has given way to a sustained
inquiry into the specific ways in which law matters, the “second generation” of empirical
international legal studies).
3. Id. at 627–28.
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4
about our argument. Broadly sympathetic to our view, Dean Koh
and Professor Alvarez direct much of their commentary to ways in
which the project might be refined and ways in which the descriptive
claims might be tested empirically. In this brief response, we do not
offer a comprehensive rebuttal to their essays. Instead, we seek to
clarify our project in a few theoretically crucial respects through a
focused consideration of three important themes that recur in the
replies. Specifically, we discuss (1) the need for case studies
documenting in detail the processes whereby, and the actors through
which, global norms diffuse; (2) potential deficiencies in our model
resulting from a failure to account for important variables; and (3)
features of acculturation that question its conceptual coherence and
its normative appeal.

I. CAUSAL PATHWAYS
Dean Koh and Professor Alvarez suggest that more fine-grained
empirical work is required to document the specific causal pathways
by which law influences states. We agree. Further empirical research
is required to illustrate more concretely how states are acculturated.
In our view, sufficient evidence supports the proposition that states
respond to global cultural forces, but this evidence says little about
how this process works. Our conceptual analysis of the mechanisms of
social influence, for expositional clarity, is pitched at a fairly high
level of abstraction. Although useful theoretically, some important
questions remain unanswered. States, as such, are not socialized—
they are not coerced, persuaded, or acculturated.5 Rather, state
6
practice ultimately reflects the socialization of relevant individuals.

4. José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh,
Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975 (2005).
5. See Alvarez, supra note 4, at 969 (“In common parlance, states (or ‘organizations’ in
the abstract) do not ‘socialize’; people do.”); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 654–55 (noting
that government representatives, special interest groups, or domestic audiences may be the
causal pathway to state acculturation).
6. This is not to say that state-level analysis is ill conceived or unimportant. Indeed, states,
like many complex organizations, are purposive actors embedded in a wider institutional
environment. Moreover, states are highly legitimated actors imbued with legal rights and
obligations. As such, the study of “state behavior” is coherent and important. See, e.g., José E.
Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 183, 243–45 (2001) (critiquing liberal theories for their failure to recognize that “states
may continue to operate as unitary units”); Alexander Wendt, The State as Person in
International Theory, 30 REV. INT’L STUD. 289, 289 (2004) (“But all of this discussion assumes
that the idea of state personhood is meaningful and at some fundamental level makes sense. In a
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The remaining questions concern which individuals are socialized, in
what ways, and under what conditions.
As Dean Koh and Professor Alvarez point out, case studies are
an important means of addressing these questions. Case studies would
help identify, with some precision, how each of the mechanisms
operates and the axes along which states vary in their amenability to
coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. The need for case studies,
though, does not diminish the importance of the theoretical claims at
the heart of our Article. Theoretical models based exclusively on
coercion or persuasion fail to explain some important aspects of the
processes by which international law is received into domestic legal
7
systems. Case studies will provide findings that are both more
satisfactory and more useful if they develop mechanism-based
explanations of observed outcomes and if in doing so they account for
all three mechanisms of social influence. Finally, case studies,
although indispensable, must not displace world-level studies that
illuminate important global patterns discernable only in the
aggregate. If we were to conduct in-depth case studies of recent
constitution-making processes in, say, one hundred states, we would
likely discern a bewildering diversity of national cultures, institutional
structures, important players, driving personalities, and the like. No
two processes would look exactly the same. Yet, global patterns of
state practice convincingly demonstrate that national constitutions
are strikingly (and increasingly) similar. Overemphasis on the
idiosyncratic would obscure potentially significant regularities. The
lesson is clear: case studies should supplement, but not displace, the
broader theoretical project of explaining how and why these global
patterns emerge.
Consider Professor Brian Simpson’s excellent article about
Britain and the Genocide Convention—discussed at length by
Professor Alvarez.8 Professor Simpson’s article clearly exhibits some
of the strengths and weaknesses of the case study approach. It also
demonstrates the importance of mechanism-based theorizing
field in which almost everything is contested, this seems to be one thing on which almost all of
us agree.”).
7. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 625 (noting that models based on coercion
“fail[] to grasp the complexity of the social environment within which states act” and models
based on persuasion “fail[] to account for many ways in which the diffusion of social and legal
norms occurs”).
8. A.W. Brian Simpson, Britain and the Genocide Convention, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 5,
discussed in Alvarez, supra note 4, at 962–967.
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generally and the inadequacy of approaches based exclusively on
coercion and persuasion. We discuss each of these points briefly. We
should, however, make clear that our claims here are not critical of
Professor Simpson’s study. Professor Simpson meticulously
documents the complex events surrounding Britain’s decision to ratify
the Genocide Convention, describing these events in narrative
fashion. He does not purport to demonstrate or test specific
theoretical claims.9 The work is not devised to demonstrate that any
particular factor—such as bureaucratic politics—has a causal
influence on the inculcation of a norm. Deriving general lessons from
this particular study thus requires a theoretical model to explain what
is significant and why. Our aim here is to explicate, by reference to
Professor Simpson’s study, the strengths and weaknesses of case
studies for this larger endeavor.
First, several salient features of Professor Simpson’s study
illustrate the hazards of generalizing from a single case. Britain
occupied a fairly anomalous position in the world. It was an
economically and militarily powerful state and a stable democracy
with a deep cultural and institutional commitment to the rule of law.
These factors would likely implicate Britain’s amenability to
socialization in various respects. More fundamentally, it is unclear
whether Britain was a characteristically recalcitrant state. Britain
obviously accepted the genocide prohibition espoused by the
Convention throughout the period under study—the ratification
controversy centered on procedural aspects of the treaty. The study
documents Britain’s encounter with the global norm prohibiting
genocide only with respect to the specific decisions to codify and
ratify the Genocide Convention—only a thin slice of Britain’s
relationship with the norm. The inquiry into whether, when, and to
what degree state socialization occurs extends well beyond identifying
the determinants of treaty drafting and ratification. Some states may,
for example, resist ratification even as they embrace the underlying
substantive commitments of a treaty. In sum, the focus on one state
and its relationship to a human rights norm at a single point in time
complicates any attempt to draw conclusions that generalize to other
cases. Like all good case studies, however, the specific details can help
generate hypothetical theoretical propositions that might then be
tested in the aggregate.

9.

Indeed, Professor Simpson expressly disclaims any attempt to do so. Id.
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Second, Professor Simpson’s study demonstrates that much is
missed by conceptual models relying solely on coercion and
persuasion—suggesting an important explanatory role for
acculturation. The study is, indeed, replete with allusions to social and
cognitive pressures emanating from the global normative
environment (notably bearing down on a major world power). In
general, various calculations were made to “avoid embarrassment,
always a powerful motive in British diplomacy.”10 The Home Office
was nervous that “diplomats, driven by different motives, and always
anxious to maintain British international prestige, might fail to give
enough weight to their concerns.”11
Consider the application of these general statements to the
stages of codification. Initial British resistance to creating a treaty
reflected the embedded nature of the norm. At that stage, many
12
considered a treaty unnecessary and a risk to established
13
proscriptions against genocide. British resistance apparently yielded
due to the consensus of states expressing an opposing view. Professor
Simpson states: “No other State was so dismissive; as time passed it
became increasingly clear that the negative line adopted was
becoming embarrassing, and could be viewed as showing indifference
to genocide.”14 According to an internal British memorandum, the
government’s position was becoming “dangerously near
unsupportable.”15 Similarly, during the drafting process, internal
communications indicate various decisions were made to avoid
“leav[ing] the U.K. open to the charge that we alone of members of
the United Nations were not prepared to do anything to discourage
10. Id. at 13; see also id. at 28 (noting that Sir Gladwyn Jebb, a British diplomat and
member of the British delegation participating in the drafting of the treaty, “was concerned
primarily with British reputation as it was affected by the negotiations in Paris”).
11. Id. at 16 (citation omitted); see also id. at 19 (discussing the concern of a Home Office
representative that “the Foreign Office, anxious to enhance British prestige, and to score points
off the Soviets and the anti-colonial group . . . would pay inadequate attention to the problems
for the Home Office”).
12. See id. at 10 (describing “scepticism as to whether the adoption of a Genocide
Convention would serve any useful purpose” including the fact that “[g]enocide was already a
crime against international law”).
13. See id. (“On 10 February 1948 Lord Chancellor Jowitt . . . made a statement which
thereafter ranked as defining the Labour government’s policy. A Convention was probably not
necessary, and a Convention to which few States acceded might weaken the condemnation of
genocide.”).
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id. (quoting Home Office Minute, June 22, 1948, British National Archives, Home
Office [hereinafter HO] 45/25308).
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genocide.” Whether to vote for adoption of the Convention was
another contentious issue between the Foreign Office and the Home
Office. The government ultimately voted in favor after the British
representative told the Foreign Secretary that by failing to do so “we
shall find ourselves in a minority consisting of the Slav States and
South Africa and we shall lay ourselves open to severe and, I think
myself, justified criticism both in the Assembly and at home.”17 He
continued that the stance of the Slavic States “provide[s] an excellent
argument in support of our thesis that the Slav system is a backward
one, rather than providing an occasion for us to line up with Slav
states against every progressive and right thinking country in the
world.”18
On the ultimate question of whether to ratify the treaty,
proponents again cited global trends as a reason to join.19 Such
arguments were weaker than they had been earlier in the treaty
codification process. Unlike the consensus of states supporting
adoption of the text, ratification patterns were mixed (for example,
20
the United States was not a party). Global pressures also influenced
the opposition to ratification. Significantly, the principal argument
against accession was based on commitments undertaken by Britain
in its extradition agreements.21 Also, a clear solution—ratifying the

16. Id. at 17 (quoting Home Office Minute, July 9, 1948, British National Archives, HO
45/25308/95025/10); cf. id. at 22 (discussing pressure to adhere to the Convention if its adopted
text closely resembled that proposed by the British).
17. Id. at 33 (quoting Telegram 675 from Sir Hartley Shawcross, attorney general, to
Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary (Dec. 4, 1948), copy in British National Archives, HO 45/25308
& Foreign Office [hereinafter FO] 371/72693/UN 3305).
18. Id. at 34 (quoting Telegram 675 from Sir Hartley Shawcross, attorney general, to
Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary (Dec. 4, 1948), copy British National Archives, HO 45/25308 &
FO 371/72693/UN 3305). These examples help illustrate the lack of cost-benefit calculations that
characterize acculturation. That is, actors compelled by reputation- and status-based concerns
were not, according to Simpson’s evidence, actively assessing the relative merits of the
substantive norm prohibiting genocide. The British decision to conform had more to do with
Britain’s place in the world and its aversion to occupying an outlier position.
19. See id. at 44, 50 (discussing the position of the Foreign Office); id. at 48 (discussing a
joint memorandum by the Home Office and the Foreign Office supporting accession and
warning of “useful propaganda to the Communists if we failed to support a measure which had
on the face of it such laudable intentions and had already been accepted, for all its limitations,
by 38 States”) (quoting Joint Memorandum of the Home and Foreign Offices, July 29, 1952,
British National Archives, Cabinet Office 129/54 C.(52) 271).
20. See id. at 52 (discussing the failure of the United States to ratify as a reason for delay);
id. at 49 (“By [1952] Australia, Canada and Sri Lanka had acceded, so the UK was becoming
out of step with the Commonwealth.”).
21. Id. at 45–47, 58.
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22
Convention with a reservation —was firmly rejected by influential
Foreign Office Legal Adviser Gerald Fitzmaurice as an affront to
global values inherent in treaty law.23 The entire episode perhaps best
illustrates that considerable resistance was required to withstand the
24
normative pressure favoring ratification.
The upshot of all this is that models based exclusively on
coercion or persuasion fail to account for crucial aspects of the case.
An integrated theory of social mechanisms that combines case studies
with global-level analysis would provide a more satisfactory
understanding of how coercion, persuasion, and acculturation
influence states.

II. MISSING VARIABLES
Dean Koh and Professor Alvarez also identify several important
variables that affect the probability of state socialization. Our model
of acculturation, they suggest, is arguably incomplete (or
underspecified) in that it fails to account for these important
variables. These arguments, which comprise much of the replies, are
useful and, up to a point, unquestionably correct. That is, we too
expect that the presence and strength of all three mechanisms of
social influence will co-vary with features of the sort they identify. For
example, we agree with Dean Koh that the structural social position
of a state affects the probability that the state would respond to social
pressure.25 We also agree with Professor Alvarez that state practice
will vary according to the explanatory factors he distills from the case
of Britain’s ratification of the Genocide Convention—personal
leadership, bureaucracy, and preexisting legal doctrine (and, more

22. Simpson suggests that the whole debate could have been avoided if the Foreign Office
had conceded this point, because the Home Office supported ratification subject to a
reservation. See id. at 48 (“The Home Office suggested accession subject to a reservation over
political asylum; this the Foreign Office, and in particular Fitzmaurice, strongly opposed.”).
23. See id. at 54 (“[W]e have always maintained the view that it is both morally wrong and
legally invalid to make reservations on articles of substance which go to the root of a
Convention.”) (quoting Foreign Office Minute, Aug. 19, 1960, British National Archives, FO
371/153555/UN 1643/2).
24. Cf. id. at 53 (“Left to themselves the [Foreign Office] would have recommended
accession long ago, but we have met with solid obstruction of the kind that only the Home
Office can produce.”) (quoting Foreign Office Minute, Feb. 20, 1955, British National Archives,
FO 371/117436/UN 16453/4).
25. See Koh, supra note 4, at 980 (discussing the examples of the United States, China, and
North Korea). Dean Koh also rightly notes that the mechanics of law’s influence will vary for
states that have recently experienced fundamental political transition. Id. at 981.
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26
generally, commitment to the rule of law). And, of course, we could
add several others such as regime type, national wealth, rich-poor
gap, and the existence of a recent civil war.
The sort of variable-based empirical work contemplated by Dean
Koh and Professor Alvarez is crucial to the development of a
satisfactory theory of law’s role in international politics. Our claim
here is only that an integrated, mechanism-based theory of law’s
influence is an important, although currently neglected, step toward
developing a richer, more useful, empirical understanding of
international law.27 Two considerations help explain our position.
First, variable-based theorizing, though an important complement to
the approach we advocate, offers no good reason to question our
mechanism-based model. The aim of our project is to identify the
mechanisms by which law influences state behavior—and to
demonstrate the extent and significance of inconsistent regime design
recommendations issuing from these various mechanisms. Whether a
factor affects the presence or strength of any particular mechanism is
a secondary consideration. This important conceptual distinction
between the methodological orientations of mechanism- and variablebased theorizing is well understood in the social and natural
sciences.28

26. See Alvarez, supra note 4, at 965 (“Yet bureaucratic politics, personal leadership (or
lack thereof), and positive law would all appear to be part of the necessary description of how
and why Britain hesitated but ultimately joined [the Genocide Convention].”).
27. By “mechanism-based theorizing,” we mean simply an approach that “systematically
seeks to explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations . . . .”
Peter Hedström & Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay, in SOCIAL
MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY 1 (Peter Hedström & Richard
Swedberg eds., 1998); see also id. at 7 (“[A] mechanism can be seen as a systematic set of
statements that provide a plausible account of how [two observed phenomena] are linked to one
another.”). In short, mechanism-based theorizing emphasizes causal processes rather than
patterns of statistical co-variation. See, e.g., James Mahoney, Tentative Answers to Questions
About Causal Mechanisms, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/
cqrm/APSA2003/Mahoney_APSA_2003.pdf (“Whereas correlational analysis involves
identifying antecedents regularly conjoined with outcomes, causal analysis consists of specifying
the ‘mechanism’ that underlies and generates empirical regularities and outcomes.”).
28. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS
1–10, 36–47 (1999) (contrasting the mechanism approach with the statistical (i.e., variable)
approach); Hedström & Swedberg, supra note 27, at 7–10, 15–17 (describing the need for
mechanism-based theories and how such theories differ from variable-based analyses); Peter
Machamer et al., Thinking About Mechanisms, 67 PHIL. SCI. 1, 2–4 (2000) (noting that
mechanisms attempt “to explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some significant
process works”).
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Second, mechanism-based theories help overcome several
limitations of variable-based, correlational analysis. Mechanismbased theorizing facilitates integration of diverse correlational
29
findings by identifying why and how factors are related. Mechanismbased approaches also facilitate systematic evaluation of whether an
observed relation reflects true causation—helping sort out spurious
correlations and minimizing the problems of selectivity and omitted
variable bias.30
III. NORMATIVE C O N CERN S
Finally, Dean Koh and Professor Alvarez raise several questions
about the normative appeal of acculturation as regime strategy.
Before considering two of these questions more closely, we should
emphasize that we do not maintain that acculturation is the most
effective, or even the most important, mechanism of social influence
in international society. Like coercion and persuasion, acculturation is
more likely to succeed under certain conditions—and more likely to
fail under others. Our point is that states respond to global culture
just as other complex organizations respond to cultural forces in their
broader institutional environments. As we document in great detail,
much state practice—in areas such as education, human rights,
environmental protection, and the military—is not adequately
explained by coercion or persuasion models.31 Put simply,
acculturation is one social process by which states are influenced,
irrespective of the relative merits of designing global regulatory
regimes based on it. That said, we offer some provisional reflections
on two of the normative issues raised in the replies. Our aim here is to
demonstrate that acculturation-based strategies are no more

29. See, e.g., James Mahoney, Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory
and Method, 16 SOC. F. 575, 577 (2001). Indeed, we suspect that the correlational character of
much sociological research has limited its influence in legal studies. Contrast the relevance of
sociology with that of economics, which is substantially organized around the mechanisms of the
market and individual wealth maximization. Mechanism-based social theories, we submit, would
intersect more directly with debates about institutional design and consequently would facilitate
greater reliance on sociological insights in legal research programs.
30. See, e.g., Hedström & Swedberg, supra note 27, at 15–17; Mahoney, supra note 29,
at 575.
31. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 646–56; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1757–65 (2003) (noting
that “conventional theories of the state cannot easily explain the depth and breadth” of
developments in areas such as environmental and education reform).
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normatively suspect than coercion- or persuasion-based strategies
(and are perhaps less so in some respects).
The first question is whether acculturation, as we describe it,
would advance international regime objectives—such as the
promotion of fundamental human rights—in any meaningful way.
This concern is generated in large part by our own conceptual
analysis of acculturation and the empirical evidence we adduce to
support this analysis. On the conceptual level, Dean Koh points out
that acculturation, as we describe it, constitutes incomplete
persuasion—a form of partial internalization of a norm or rule. In this
sense, acculturation might be understood as a second-best
socialization strategy; as such, persuasion should be understood as the
32
ultimate objective of any regime. On the empirical level, Professor
Alvarez questions whether the persistent decoupling of form and
function documented in our Article suggests that acculturation
produces, at best, shallow, cosmetic reforms in state practice.33 Both
the conceptual and empirical variations of this claim have substantial
merit, but neither should be pushed too far.
As a conceptual matter, acculturation does not necessarily
constitute a second-best alternative to persuasion—nor does it
invariably serve as a potential bridge between coercion and
34
persuasion in the progressive reception of a norm. Indeed, the
acculturation mechanism can generate complete internalization
(unconditional acceptance) of a norm. And, again as a conceptual
matter, this point is consistent with our claim that acculturation is
often characterized by public conformity without private acceptance.
Our argument turns on the distinction between the concept of
acculturation and the evidence used to document its existence. In our
argument, we employ a conception of acculturation as a causal
35
process, rather than a conception of acculturation as an outcome. As
we outline in the Article, acculturation is the process by which actors
adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture,

32. Koh, supra note 4, at 980–81.
33. Alvarez, supra note 4, at 970–72.
34. See Koh, supra note 4, at 980 (“What Goodman and Jinks should clarify is that, at base,
their third way—acculturation—is really an intermediate way between coercion and
persuasion . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
35. See generally John W. Berry, Conceptual Approaches to Acculturation, in
ACCULTURATION: ADVANCES IN THEORY, MEASUREMENT, AND APPLIED RESEARCH (Kevin
M. Chun et al. eds., 2003) (describing process- and outcome-based conceptions of
acculturation).
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without actively assessing either the merits of those beliefs and
36
behaviors or the material costs and benefits of conforming to them.
Clearly, this process, as a conceptual matter, need not result in
incomplete or shallow internalization. Indeed, state actors often
embrace norms because they reflect (taken-for-granted) global scripts
of what “liberal” or “modern” states do.37
Although we rely heavily on patterns of “public conformity
without private acceptance” (decoupling) to document the presence
of acculturation in international society, we do so only because of the
evidentiary value of these behavioral patterns. Because coercion,
persuasion, and acculturation all result in behavioral change, the
presence or absence of these mechanisms must be inferred from some
evidence other than the simple fact of behavioral change. The
question is what type of evidence suggests the presence or absence of
any of these mechanisms. As we develop more fully in the Article,
evidence of incomplete internalization is useful because it tends to
support acculturation-based explanations and discredit persuasion-

36. The details of the formulation offered in the text are, for many reasons outlined in our
Article, of great theoretical and practical importance. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at
644–68. The acculturation process, properly understood, is not driven by “unthinking”
individuals. Rather, it is what target actors consider (and fail to consider) that characterizes
acculturation. Under acculturation, actors are motivated by neither material costs and benefits
nor the inherent validity or propriety of a practice or belief. Actors, however, are motivated to
change their behavior. As we discuss more fully in the Article, cognitive and social pressures
drive acculturation. See id. at 639–42. These pressures motivate actors precisely because they are
understood as “costs” and “benefits.” Cognitive pressures induce change because actors are
motivated to minimize cognitive discomfort (such as dissonance); and social pressures induce
change because actors are motivated to minimize social/reputational costs. See id. This is not to
say that actors calculate these cognitive and social costs in any precise way. Indeed, we suggest
that actors hoard cognitive comfort and social legitimacy under certain conditions. See id. at
640–42, 645–46; see also id. at 642 (suggesting that the probability of conformity increases as the
importance of, exposure to, and size of the reference group increases).
37. See, e.g., John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority and
Organization, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL 71, 75–80 (George Thomas et al. eds., 1987) (asserting that expansion of
state authority and organization can be partly attributed to belief that such expansion is what
“modern” states do); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC.
144, 145 (1997) (“Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the
structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually all of the
domains of rationalized social life . . . .”). See generally GILI S. DRORI ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE
MODERN WORLD POLITY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION (2003)
(documenting the global diffusion of scientific discourse and state-level science policy by
processes of emulation and mimicry).
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based explanations. In other words, such evidence can help arbitrate
between competing, but otherwise equally plausible, accounts of why
a particular norm diffuses. Even if incomplete internalization is best
understood as acculturation’s footprint, it is ultimately an empirical,
rather than conceptual, question whether acculturation is often (or
even typically) associated with public conformity without private
acceptance.
As Professor Alvarez points out, the empirical record we
describe suggests that incomplete internalization is common in
international society. The potentially troublesome empirical finding is
that structural isomorphism across states is often decoupled from
functional task demands. Put differently, states often emulate global
models on the organizational or formal level without effecting
substantial change on the ground. In human rights law, for example,
states ratify international human rights treaties and enact liberal,
rights-based constitutions, but these formal changes often do not alter
substantially their commitment to human rights standards in day-to39
day governance. In short, this pattern of state behavior exhibits
public conformity without private acceptance. The theory is that
states conform their formal structure to the perceived commitments
of world society while acting in accordance with their idiosyncratic
preferences on the ground, where state practice is perceived to be
relatively insulated from global scrutiny. Given this backdrop,
Professor Alvarez understandably questions whether acculturation is
a normatively attractive organizing principle for international human
rights regimes.
This line of reasoning, however, requires substantial
qualification. The fundamental problem with this normative critique
is that it is predicated on a static conception of acculturation.
Acculturation sets in motion multiple dynamics that, under proper
conditions, prompt meaningful change in state behavior. Although it
is beyond the scope of this short response to consider these dynamics
in any systematic way, we note a few important examples to illustrate

38. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 643 (“Because the acculturation process does not
involve actually agreeing with the merits of a group’s position, it may result in outward
conformity with a social convention without private acceptance or corresponding changes in
private practices.”).
39. See id. at 651 (“In general, the adoption of structural commitments or official policy
goals in human rights does not necessarily entail concrete implementation.”); see also Meyer et
al., supra note 37, at 154–56 (describing decoupling as the adoption of structural forms without
actual implementation of practices that the structural form is intended to foster and require).
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the nuts and bolts of our point. Consider three: shifts in political
opportunity structure, the “civilizing force of hypocrisy,” and state
learning.
First, “shallow” structural reform—such as the ratification of a
human rights treaty or the enactment of a constitutional rights
provision—often constitutes an important shift in the domestic
political opportunity structure of the reforming state. These shifts
often disproportionately empower groups and individuals committed
to the cause of human rights—perhaps by imbuing human rights
nongovernmental organizations with social legitimacy or by
emboldening private citizens to seek formal redress for human rights
violations.40 In more extreme cases, these shifts may enable such
groups to secure more meaningful policy reforms through the
political process.41 In other words, formal changes create
opportunities for private actors to promote the observance of human
rights norms irrespective of whether the reforming government has
any interest in doing so. Although these changes typically do not
cause dramatic, immediate reductions in human rights violations,
formal organizational changes do produce tangible effects on the
ground.
Second, acculturation triggers what Professor Jon Elster calls the
“civilizing force of hypocrisy.”42 One aspect of this idea is that public
preference falsification is difficult to sustain over time because of two
important audience effects. First, various constituencies will provide
incentives for public actors to live up to their “hypocritical”
endorsement of a norm. The publicity of their acts creates
expectations in relevant audiences, and the failure to meet these
expectations will generate various forms of political and social
pressure to do so. Second, public conformity signals to other

40. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 11–35 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
41. See, e.g., Darren Hawkins & Melissa Humes, Human Rights and Domestic Violence,
117 POL. SCI. Q. 231, 242 (2002) (“During crises or political shifts, . . . officials are more willing
to engage in broad-ranging debates about the nature of state–society relations in a variety of
issue areas and to attempt restructuring processes. These moments of political debate provide
the best opportunities for activist groups to influence state action.”).
42. Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97,
111 (Jon Elster ed., 1998); see also Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for
War, 99 AMER. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2005) (describing “blowback effects” by which the
justificatory practices of states ultimately constrain state action irrespective of whether the
justifications are pretextual).
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recalcitrant actors that social opposition to the norm in question is
declining (or, put differently, that social support for the norm is
rising). In other words, public conformity, even without private
acceptance, exerts collateral influence on other actors in the social
system. Cognitively, acculturation narrows the gap between public
acts and private preferences: “under certain conditions people change
their beliefs to avoid the unpleasant state of cognitive dissonance
between what they profess in public and what they believe in
private.”43
Third, acculturation, when coupled with the dynamics of state
learning, encourages states to make increasingly meaningful change.
Although shallow acts of public conformity might yield some shortterm social benefit to the conforming state, other states will learn
over time that these acts do not necessarily signal genuine acceptance
of the norm in question. As a consequence, conforming states will be
required to enact increasingly meaningful reforms to capture the
same social benefit.44 For example, the simple act of ratifying a human
rights treaty might initially generate some social and political capital
for the ratifying state, but failure to improve human rights conditions
on the ground will erode, over time, the importance of this signal
(both for the ratifying state itself and for all future would-be ratifying
states). To capture the same social and political capital in the future,
states might have to enact domestic legislation implementing treaty
obligations. This learning dynamic, therefore, triggers an iterative
process in which states may be eventually required to embrace
remarkably robust institutional commitments. Indeed, the day may
come when only a demonstrably strong human rights record on the
ground will capture the same social and political benefit generated
initially by superficial reforms. Recent empirical work strongly
suggests that shallow ratifications trigger a range of social dynamics
that ultimately improve states’ actual human rights practices.45

43. Jon Elster, Timur Kuran: Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of
Preference Falsification, 39 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 112, 115 (1996) (book review); see also LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
44. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The Limits of Rational Choice Theories of International Law, 94
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (applying this line of argument to rational choice theories of
international human rights law).
45. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World:
The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1378 (2005) (arguing that the global
institutionalization of human rights occasioned by disingenuous treaty ratifications improves
human rights conditions on the ground). We should note that we have reservations about the
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Professor Alvarez also suggests that social dynamics of the sort
we describe here will often take time. This point, in our view, is
almost certainly correct, but the significance of the “time lag” factor
should not be overstated. Of course, we should not expect to build a
durable global human rights culture quickly (though substantial
progress has been made in a remarkably brief period of time).
Perhaps a time line of an additional twenty, thirty, or forty years for
the accomplishment of this goal is not altogether unreasonable or
unacceptable. Moreover, substantial global acculturation has
occurred rapidly at times—for example, the global diffusion of selfdetermination/decolonization and women’s suffrage documented in
our Article. And, finally, the processual (hence, time-consuming)
character of acculturation is, in some important respects, a strength
rather than a weakness. Although coercion and persuasion may be
more efficient, under certain conditions, at generating meaningful
behavioral change quickly, these mechanisms have greater difficulty
sustaining change over time without some measure of acculturation.
Acculturation, on its own, may be poorly suited to generate change
quickly, but it is likely to produce durable behavioral regularities.46
One final normative issue, raised by Professor Alvarez, is
whether acculturation-based international institutions might serve as
“vehicles for neocolonialism”—or, put differently, whether
acculturation-based strategies provide for the “imposition” of
47
hegemonic power. Acculturation, however, should generally involve
less “imposition” than coercion or persuasion—recall that the former
involves the use of material rewards and punishments and the latter
involves the strategic (and some would say pernicious) manipulation
of rhetorical frames to secure acceptance. The empirical record

methods used in the Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui study to estimate aggregate levels of human rights
abuses. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003). Nevertheless, we think it important to note that the
findings of this important new study are broadly consistent with the internalization dynamics we
have outlined. Other recent studies document similar patterns in the diffusion of other global
models of legitimate statehood. See, e.g., Gili S. Drori, Governed by Governance: The
Institutionalization of Governance as Prism for Organizational Change, in WORLD SOCIETY
AND THE EXPANSION OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION *1, *34 (Gili S. Drori et al. eds., forthcoming
2006); Gili S. Drori et al., Sources of Rationalized Governance: Cross-National Longitudinal
Analyses, 1985–2002, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. (forthcoming 2005).
46. See Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, 42 AM.
SOC. REV. 726, 726 (1977) (noting that “social knowledge once institutionalized exists as a fact,
as part of objective reality,” and thus ensures “cultural persistence”).
47. Alvarez, supra note 4, at 974.
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described in the Article also suggests that the concern is misplaced.
Global acculturation processes have often facilitated the diffusion of
counterhegemonic norms such as decolonization; economic, social,
48
and cultural rights; and women’s suffrage. Counterhegemonic norms
exhibit the same general diffusion pattern as prohegemonic norms,
which suggests that the mechanics of acculturation do not turn on the
relative material power of the relevant actors. Powerful states are
often late adopters in some areas, including human rights law—
suggesting that acculturation provides a vehicle for weak states to
influence powerful states.49 Finally, the nature of acculturation
renders it highly resistant to abuse. Because the strength and
direction of acculturation require identifying target actors with the
agents of socialization, abuse of these processes would undermine the
trust and social legitimacy that makes acculturation possible in the
first place. More fundamentally, the effective employment of
acculturation would facilitate the diffusion and institutionalization of
the international human rights regime, which includes substantive
commitments to self-determination, political dissent, and open
political processes. All this, in short, suggests that acculturation does
not necessarily play into the hands of power, and may indeed provide
a framework within which weaker actors might challenge powerful
ones.
****
We owe a great debt to Dean Koh and Professor Alvarez for
their constructively critical evaluation of our theory of social
influence. The exchange has provided us the opportunity to refine our
conceptual model, scrutinize its normative assumptions, and begin to
chart future lines of empirical research. The larger project, to develop
an empirically rigorous theory of international law, and the ultimate
objective, to improve the performance of international institutions
such as human rights regimes, are the benefactors of their efforts.

48. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 653 (noting that acculturation plays a role in the
diffusion of counterhegemonic norms because such diffusion cannot be explained by
“conventional conceptions of global power politics”).
49. Id.

